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Moral Equality
for the Least Advantaged
Dewayne Winrow
The civil rights struggle of the sixties was a move-
ment by people who historically had been on the under-
side of the American dream. It was mainly a struggle for
social justice, narrowly viewed-a demand for social in-
clusion and social equality. However, in the post-sixties
era, the more radical wing of the civil rights movement
took center stage. The emphasis of those in the radical
wing, namely, the black nationalist and feminist move-
ments, was on not civil rights, but human rights. Their
struggle, though often misguided, was not simply for so-
cial equality and inclusion, it was for moral equality as a
basic human entitlement.
The purpose of this article is to highlight the tension
between moral and social equality. My thesis is that moral
equality, a fundamental moral principle, is the absolute
principle that should fashion non-absolute social practices,
policies, and arrangements. All social praxis must be sen-
sitive to changing circumstances; the more basic concomi-
tants of moral equality must constantly measure that praxis.
Moral equality affirms the postulate that all persons
have the same intrinsic worth. That is in no way to say
that all people are or should be equal in all respects. As is
often the case, human beings may be unequal in talents,
in contributions to social life, and in valid claims to re-
wards and resources. However, everyone who is a person
is presumptively entitled to recognition of that personhood.
That is the starting point for moral reasoning.
The first premise of moral equality is that all people
are of the same kind: they are alike in morally relevant
ways. All normal persons are roughly equal in moral com-
petence and vulnerability. They have much the same ca-
pacity for moral choice with respect to their personal lives.
Despite differences in culture, experience, character, and
education, there are no moral elites. All people are sin-
ners, affected by the problem of human finitude. All are
in need of moral guidance. A corollary notion is that all
humans are roughly equal in their capacity to become fully
realized persons. Everyone possesses a socially formed
self and can invest that self with intrinsic worth. The dif-
ferences among people are highly individual, not system-
atic.
A Normative Idea
Moral equality is a normative idea, the chief covenan-
tal principle of a moral community. The Judeo-Christian
tradition strongly associates the righteousness of the cov-
enant community with concern for the poor and power-
less, for "the least of these my brethren." In Matt 25:31-
46 those placed on the king's left hand (the place of disfa-
vor) evidenced their unrighteousness by their failure to
treat the disadvantaged as "brethren." It is also significant
that the marks of lostness Jesus mentions in this narrative
are not gross sins committed but rather simple acts of kind-
ness not committed. Indeed, the issue is not the particular
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sins of omission mentioned here, but the sin of
unrighteousness. Faith righteousness is the fundamental
covenant requirement. It is a righteousness that is acquired
through sharing by faith the character of Him who is
wholly other-regarding.
Although moral equality is a normative idea, it is an
idea derived from human experience. The criteria of equal-
ity-the respects in which people are to be considered
equal--derive from our understanding of what they need
to sustain their dignity as persons.
The Essentials
The definition of what is vital to the status of
personhood establishes what is essential human equality.
The claim to essential equality is a claim to what social
theorists once called "natural rights." It is a claim for life
itself and the conditions that make life possible, tolerable,
and hopeful. In the words of the Declaration, essential
equality means that all persons have an equal claim to
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." On the other
hand, all persons do not have a claim to equal prosperity,
good fortune, or happiness; they do not have a claim to an
equally good life or to the fullness of social goods or val-
ues. An equal right to hold property is not a right to equal
property. Moral equality calls for a baseline of entitlement
to basic social goods that affirms the personhood of all
human beings.
Moral Equality and Social Praxis
As we effect the transition from covenantal principle
to community practice, or from animating ideal to going
concern, the principle becomes ambiguous and vulnerable.
It is often hard to disentangle moral from social equality.
The present state of social discourse and debate is indica-
tive of this problem.
Radical egalitarianism sees no difference between the
two. But although they are connected in important ways,
they are also distinct. Moral equality is a starting point for
moral discourse. It is a basis for regulating social prac-
tices such as equal treatment, protection, and opportunity.
It is also a basis for criticizing social inequalities of rank,
opportunity, and resources, which are sometimes neces-
sary and desirable. The following examples will suffice.
Equal Treatment
Beyond the claims of essential equality, there is no
requirement that everyone be treated alike. Equal treat-
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ment is often inappropriate. What is appropriate is treat-
ment as an equal. Affirmative action policy builds upon
the implicit distinction between equality of treatment and
equality of consideration and respect. Equality of treat-
ment may run counter to equality of consideration and
respect. Equality of consideration means giving the same
weight to every person's dignity and welfare: it demands
that we take into account circumstances.
Making good the transition
from principle to practice
can be troublesome. One
must constantly ask
whether the ideal is made
good in reality.
In his book entitled Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald
Dworkin offers an insightful example. He states, "If! have
two children, and one is dying from a disease that is mak-
ing the other uncomfortable, I do not show equal concern
if I flip a coin to decide which should have the remaining
dose of a drug." This example shows that the right to treat-
ment as an equal is fundamental and the right to equal
treatment, derivative. Once one takes circumstances into
account and identifies a class of persons-that is, simi-
larly situated persons-equal treatment may be the best
way of assuring equality of respect and concern. Social
policy that is sensitive and circumstantial is equal treat-
ment for everyone who is "similarly situated."
Equal Opportunity
In the ethos of classical liberalism, the key to recon-
ciling moral and social equality is equality of opportu-
nity. Equality of opportunity is a fundamental moral claim.
One should not mistake it as a claim to equal conditions
or as a rejection of all socially derived inequality. The real
enemy to the ideal of moral equality is the caste principle.
Whatever opportunities exist should be open to all with-
out regard to social class, race, creed, ethnicity, or gender.
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The target is overcoming prejudice (personal bias) and
racism (institutional discrimination). Thus equality of
opportunity has the limited objective of overcoming preju-
dice while maintaining the legitimacy of differential re-
wards.
Making good the transition from principle to practice
can be troublesome. One must constantly ask whether the
ideal is made good in reality. Is equality of intrinsic worth
being fully recognized in fact-say, through effective
equality of opportunity?
Social inequalities are a pervasive fact of human ex-
istence. It is perverse and unrealistic to demand their total
eradication. Inequality may be good for prosperity, schol-
arship, art, family life, warfare, and much else; further-
more, it may be an inescapable fact, whatever its utility.
Those justifications, however, do not speak to the moral
issue. They do not bring the other-regarding policy to the
center of concern. They do not tell how to make inequal-
ity part of the moral order. It is to this question that we
now turn our attention.
Moralizing Social Inequality
John Rawls, in his book Justice as Fairness, sets forth
a conception of what he calls the "difference principle."
Rawls does not argue for full social equality. On the con-
trary, he assumes that inequalities are inevitable and that
one can justify them in many ways. He argues that while
social inequalities may be necessary and desirable, one
must judge their moral worth by what they contribute to
the welfare of the least advantaged. That principle strongly
echoes the Judeo-Christian association of righteousness
with concern for the poor and powerless, for "the least of
these my brethren."
For Rawls, all social values, such as liberty and op-
portunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-re-
spect, are to be distributed equally. An equal distribution
of any or all of these values is justifiable if it is to
everyone's advantage. His premise upholds equality as a
fundamental value but also recognizes that other values,
such as prosperity and security, are important to human
well-being. In reaching for difference values, moral equal-
ity cannot be compromised-but social equality is neces-
sarily given up. The challenge is to preserve the former
while sacrificing the latter. The difference principle pur-
ports to meet that challenge by insisting that inequalities
be justified by their contribution to "long-run expectations
of the least fortunate group in society."
That requirement cannot be too easily satisfied. Aweak
form of the difference principle will not carry its weight
against a heavy burden of inequality and domination. If
all one asks is that everyone gain something from a sys-
tem of inequalities, one satisfies the condition too easily.
A system of trickle-down economics might fulfill the dif-
ference principle in a weak form, but that is not what Rawls
has in mind. The difference principle is not to be satisfied
by any benefit. Rather, inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are "to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged." In principle, inequality is morally justified
if it does more than equality can do to improve the pros-
pects of the least advantaged. A feasible alternative that
does as well or better with less inequality should, how-
ever, be preferred.
Rawls' difference principle is not contrary to the bib-
lical notion of social justice. In the biblical view, a
community's righteousness is measured by its treatment
of the powerless in society, which the Bible often describes
as the widow, the orphan, the poor, and the stranger (non-
Israelite) in the land. In that view, belief in the moral equal-
ity of the least advantaged establishes an obligation of
assistance. Inequality as such is not the issue; it is not a
question of requiring those who have more to help those
who have less just because they have less. The case is
more desperate. The obligation is to people who are de-
graded because of their disadvantage, to people who are
in danger of being excluded or forgotten as objects of moral
concern.
In conclusion, the concept of community generates
expectations for effective or full membership. It is not
enough to restrain or even to overcome the divisiveness
of stigma. The dignity of community membership carries
with it a panoply of duties and rights, including rights of
participation. A society committed to moral equality needs
to find ways to uphold the ultimate worth of persons. A
moral society will uphold every person's moral worth
without regard to differences of talent, effort, or charac-
ter. That requires a more integral, more communitarian
conception of how moral and social equalities are related.
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